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ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Reynolds addresses the space law issues likely to be of most importance in the next several decades.
Pressing issues include those of orbital debris and geostationary orbit crowding, private property rights in outer space
resources, conflict over international trade in space goods and services, the danger of ballistic-missile technology proliferation,
private remote-sensing systems, and the law of international cooperation in space. Professor Reynolds concludes with a
philosophical and practical discussion of some more remote issues, including the legal systems that may govern future human
societies in outer space and the legal issues that might be associated with contacting extraterrestrial intelligences.
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The year 1992 marks many important occasions: the five-hundredth anniversary of Columbus' voyage, the thirty-fifth
anniversary of Sputnik, and the seventy-fifth anniversary of the late, unlamented Bolshevik Revolution. It also marks a less
conspicuous date--the beginning of space law's fifth decade. It was 1951, just over forty years ago, that saw the publication of
what many consider the first serious space law article, by John Cobb Cooper of Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study. 1
When Cooper's article was published, the very idea of space flight itself seemed remote. Yet before twenty years were out, men
(no women, alas) would walk on the moon, only to abandon that initial foothold on another planet in the interest of electionrelated pork-barreling. 2 Few observers in 1951 would have imagined that we would go so far, so fast--or that we would abandon
our gains for such trivial reasons.
This record surely should make those of us who would forecast the future humble. Among other things, it teaches us that
progress in space-related matters is determined more by politics than by technology. Unfortunately, the course of technology
is easier to predict--and usually to follow--than politics. There are, as yet, no differential equations for human behavior.
Nonetheless, I will make the attempt. The pages that follow will outline what I expect will be the most important issues of
space law in the next few decades, those representing the transition zone of the late twentieth century and the early twentyfirst. I will also discuss a few other issues that may be less likely to come up, but that will be important if they do. Although
my treatment of these topics will necessarily be a bit *227 brief, I hope that it nonetheless will be interesting, and I encourage
others--particularly student writers, who have long careers ahead of them--to join in the discussion.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Many people are surprised to learn that the seemingly limitless expanses of outer space might need environmental protection.
The environmental problems of space, however, are bad and getting worse. 3 Already, the orbits near Earth are so cluttered
with human-made junk--mostly fragments of discarded boosters and leftover shrapnel from antisatellite weapons tests--that an
object in those orbits is more likely to collide with artificial debris than with naturally-occurring meteorites. More alarming still,
once that debris reaches a sufficient density, collisions between objects will create more debris particles, which will undergo
still more collisions, until the process becomes self-sustaining. This phenomenon is known in the trade as the “Kessler effect,”
named after an author of the pioneering paper to analyze the topic. 4 In addition, there is some evidence that the growing
quantity of human-created space junk is affecting the composition of the Van Allen radiation belts, although whether this might
affect conditions closer to Earth is unknown. 5
Several potential approaches to these environmental problems have been proposed. One is to address liability issues. I have
previously suggested a Sindell-type market share liability regime 6 under which nations would pay compensation based on their
proportional contribution to the *228 orbital-debris population. 7 This rule, of course, would not eliminate the orbital-debris
problems and should be regarded more as a means of plugging holes in the Liability Convention 8 than of completely settling
the issue. Over the long term, some sort of prospective regulatory scheme is likely to be necessary. It, too, should encourage
nations to reduce their contribution to the problem--perhaps by taxing practices in proportion to the orbital debris they create,
with proceeds going into a pool that would pay for cleanup. 9 In the interim, at least the time has arrived for the spacefaring
nations to agree on sound practices for launch and onorbit activities to minimize the problem. In a limited and informal way,
this has already happened, 10 but more needs to be done.
The orbital-debris question at least is beginning to receive the attention that it deserves, but it is not the only space
environmental issue, just the most pressing. Another is the crowding of the geostationary orbital arc, the most suitable location
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for communications satellites. In essence, the problem is that satellites cannot be placed too closely together without creating
excessive radio interference. Because satellites must remain within line of sight of their users, the problem is worse than it
might seem--the orbital arc is most crowded where it is most needed. The International Telecommunication Union has recently
arrived at a temporary solution, but the underlying difficulty will resurface unless technology rides to the rescue first. 11
Finally, nations have obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and under general principles of international law to avoid harmful
contamination of other planets (for example, with micro-organisms from Earth) and to avoid so-called “back contamination”
of the Earth with harmful extraterrestrial materials. 12 As plans go forward for both human and *229 robotic missions to
Mars (including sample-return missions), mission planners and their counsel must consider both issues. Although it is highly
unlikely, according to most experts, that Earth organisms could flourish on other planets, even in the comparatively friendly
environment of Mars, and even less likely that organisms from those planets could infect life on Earth, the stakes are too high
for carelessness until--as in the case of these possibilities with respect to the moon after the repeated Apollo visits--we have
enough experience to feel secure.

III. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A law professor of mine was fond of saying that he used to think that all property was theft, but that was before he had anything
worth stealing. This may turn out to be the story in the context of space property rights. Some years ago, when the United States
and the old Soviet Union held a monopoly on space activity, considerable hostility existed to the idea of property rights-- or at
least sovereignty, which is a different thing--in space. This hostility stemmed from two sources: fear by the have-not nations-all those without space capabilities--that the two space powers would colonize the rest of the solar system, and fear by each of
the two space powers that the other would gain a decisive advantage. 13
In this context, the no-sovereignty provisions contained in article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 14 can be seen as a way
for everyone involved to hedge the bet. Article II provides the following: “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or *230 by any other
means.” 15 This provision limits the extension of national territory, or imperium, to outer space. Some commentators also
initially argued that the provision outlaws private property rights in outer space, but the consensus now is that it does not. 16
In the context of superpower monopolies on space capability, and the Cold-War rivalry existing at the time, the no-sovereignty
provision allowed everyone to breathe easier. The United States and the Soviet Union lost the opportunity to gain a decisive
advantage by securing a claim to the moon. On the other hand, they were protected against the risk that the other would gain
such a claim first. They also were able to avoid having to deal with the resentments that non-space powers were beginning to
feel over the prospect of superpower expansion into a realm not accessible to anyone else, resentments that might have had a
real impact on Cold-War diplomatic struggles. Meanwhile, the non-space powers were freed from the risk that they would lose
out entirely on the opening of a new frontier.
These concerns with space colonization reached a new high with the 1979 Moon Treaty, which entered into force in 1984-though without the ratification of any major space power. 17 The Moon Treaty represented the views of a then-influential group
of developing-state economists who viewed Third World economic problems as resulting from Western exploitation. 18 This
group's push for a “New International Economic Order” was reflected in the Moon Treaty's hostile treatment of not only national
sovereignty (already forbidden by the 1967 Treaty), but also of private property rights--with any for-profit exploitation of space
resources to be undertaken only by a monopolistic international organization that would ensure that a share of the profits went
to developing states. 19
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If the 1967 Treaty was something like an armistice in one part of the Cold War, the 1979 Moon Treaty can be seen as a sort of
pre-emptive strike in the twenty-first century's economic wars. Being ahead of one's *231 time, however, carries some risk,
and the Moon Treaty--along, perhaps, with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, depending on one's interpretation--is a treaty
that is already obsolete. The economic theories and political realities that led to both are not enough to justify retaining them
today and are likely to be less and less applicable in the coming years.
Today, space is not the sole preserve of the United States and the Soviet Union (or its successor states). A potent European
space program now exists, Japan has a rapidly growing program, and Third-World opinion leaders like China, India, and Brazil
have important space programs, too. Nor are these states the only ones. Although the programs of the United States and the
former Soviet Union retain significant leads, those leads no longer look unassailable. When significant exploitation of space
resources begins, many nations will be participating.
Furthermore, because of intervening events, the economic ideas that underlay the Moon Treaty are no longer in fashion. At
the time of the Moon Treaty's drafting, many analysts disagreed with Walt Rostow's theory that Third World nations would
be able to catch up with more developed nations. 20 And, at the time, such disagreement might have seemed well-founded,
given the commanding lead of developed nations in technology and economic clout. Thus, statements such as the following
were common:
Rostow, ignoring the phenomena of domination and imperialism, reduced underdevelopment to a mere
question of backwardness. . . . This soothing belief in an automatic international redistribution of means
and incomes in accordance with some sort of natural law is completely unrealistic, since it takes no account
of the balance of power. The present international situation is characterized by an intensification of conflict
and a widening of the differences in power between States. 21
Things are different now. The enormous economic progress of many formerly underdeveloped nations--such as Japan, South
Korea, and the other nations of the Pacific Rim--belies the notion that economic positions cannot change. Moreover, the futility
of developed nations' efforts to stem economic tides, in both the United States and the former Soviet Union, undercuts the idea
that political factors control economic outcomes. The result is that markets, once in bad repute, are now better regarded.

With the Cold War over, and with redistributionist, anti-market international *232 economic policies out of favor, the root
causes of hostility to property rights in outer space resources have disappeared. Accordingly, no real reason seems to exist to
adopt the rather strained interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty that would prevent such property rights, or to endorse the
explicit Moon Treaty provisions, which would flatly bar them. Simply deciding that property rights in outer space resources
would not be such a bad thing is not enough. Property rights, properly implemented, would be a real boon to the rapid
development of outer space, with concurrent economic and political benefits to those of us here on Earth. 22 But the key concern
is how such rights can be properly implemented.
Well set up, property rights can serve as an important incentive to outer space development because investors have a stake
in success. That is why land grants were so instrumental in the development of the western United States: the railroads, for
example, received plots of land along their rights of way. Without development, those plots of land would have been nearvalueless plots of wilderness. With development, they were attractively located along rail lines. Similarly, property rights could
help to promote development of space resources: without development, property rights in, say, lunar land have virtually no
worth, while with development, they could become highly valuable. 23
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On the other hand, property rights are also the kind of thing over which people fight precisely because they are valuable. Taking
someone else's developed property is often easier than developing one's own. The challenge is to build a regime that encourages
the beneficial aspects of property rights, while formulating rules that discourage conflict and predation. 24
Although decades will pass before this issue becomes immediately pressing, it is worth addressing soon. Fortunately, a vehicle
for discussing these issues already exists. By its own terms, the Moon Treaty comes *233 up for review in the United Nations
General Assembly in 1994, ten years after its entry into force. Because this review will allow all nations--not just those few that
actually ratified the Moon Treaty--to discuss proposed remedies for the Treaty's flaws, it will provide an opportunity to consider
revisions. In particular, the United States should play a major part by proposing amendments to the Treaty that recognize
the important role played by private property rights in promoting development of outer space. Land-grant type mechanisms,
administered by the United Nations or by individual nations in accordance with agreed international principles, might reward
private development efforts with long-term leases or permanent property rights in space resources that they develop. Structured
properly, these mechanisms would promote a new kind of space race--one aimed at peaceful development rather than military
domination. That would be a promising start for a new century indeed.
Some proposals have urged the United States to take unilateral action, several of which have gone rather far. For example,
one group of California space enthusiasts has discussed the possibility of the United States simply repudiating the Outer Space
Treaty's no-sovereignty provisions and laying claim to the northern half of the moon. 25 Such an action, in my opinion, would
be a bad idea and would probably lead to ugly international repercussions. Nevertheless, the United States could do many things
to promote space development through property rights that would not involve violation of the no-sovereignty provision at all.
Among other things, the United States simply could state that it would recognize claims by United States nationals (and perhaps
by others as well) who discover valuable deposits of minerals or other wealth. Such resources may exist on the moon or in
near-Earth asteroids that could be exploited relatively easily. Recognition of these claims (and protection of them, if necessary,
from third parties) would not constitute “national appropriation” or the exercise of sovereignty over territory, but rather the
exercise of United States jurisdiction over its citizens and of its power to protect them against third parties in international
common areas. 26
*234 Something similar has already been done with regard to an international common area sharing the res communis character
of the space environment. In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (the Act),
which established a mechanism for recognizing mining claims by United States ventures regarding deep seabed mineral deposits
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. 27 The Act specifically provides:
it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the
interests of other states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of
international law. 28
The Act also provides that it is not to be considered an extension of sovereignty over international common areas, but rather a
mechanism for recognizing the rights of United States nationals in those areas. Section 3(a) of the Act states that:

(a) Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty--By the enactment of this Act, the United States-(1) exercises its jurisdiction over United States citizens and vessels, and foreign persons and vessels otherwise subject to its
jurisdiction, in the exercise of the high seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral
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resources of the deep seabed in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law recognized by the United
States; but
(2) does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or
resources in the deep seabed. 29
Because the Act applies to an international common area, the high seas, with the same res communis legal character as outer
space, it provides an interesting precedent for unilateral United States efforts to recognize property rights in outer space pending
some agreed-upon international regime. 30

*235 This kind of scheme does not constitute the extension of sovereignty to outer space; strictly speaking, it does not even
constitute the creation of full-fledged property rights. The right created by the provisions above is not a fee simple absolute
governing part of a celestial body, but rather an extractive right as to certain resources. It is mineral right, or right of use. Such
rights are a kind of property, but they do not represent title to land. 31 The United States obligation under the Outer Space Treaty
is simply to refrain from acts that involve national appropriation. In the absence of international agreements to the contrary, the
United States is free to experiment with methods of creating incentives for space development involving these rights and even
involving methods in which enterprises do acquire absolute title to land. 32
*236 Such efforts should be seen, however, as a transitional measure, not as a substitute for an eventual international
agreement. Nor would they be uncontroversial, anymore than the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act has been. They may
provide, however, the degree of security necessary for early space resource ventures to secure capital for their efforts. Although
this is not the place to work out an approach in detail, a full-scale property-rights regime would be desirable and probably should
possess the following characteristics. First, it should involve land grants (or grants of other interests) that would be recognized
at a minimum by all space powers and preferably by all nations on Earth. The United Nations or some other international body
may be suitable grantors. Second, those grants, like the railroad rights-of-way used to facilitate the opening of the Western
United States, should be contingent upon the grantee actually developing the land in question. Third, the land (or other interest)
should be freely alienable, at least after development. This will promote liquidity and capital formation. Fourth, reasonable
access and participation by non-space powers should be available, but only on an at-risk basis. That is, less developed countries
should be real participants, not simply possessors of a rake-off of any profits that may happen to appear. Finally, realistic and
practical dispute-resolution mechanisms should exist to ensure that disputes (over boundaries, for example) remain peaceful.
These issues may or may not become concrete within the next couple of decades. President Bush has proposed, and Congress
has begun to fund, a “Space Exploration Initiative” designed to return astronauts to outer space beyond Earth orbit, beginning
with the moon and Mars. As part of the planning process for the Initiative, a commission headed by former astronaut Thomas
Stafford has proposed four different potential architectures. 33 All of these architectures involve a return to the moon for
science and engineering; two involve a return to the moon for permanent colonization and extraction of resources. The
most ambitious, although not necessarily the most expensive, involves lunar mining to support operations on the moon and
Mars and the microwave beaming of solar power back to Earth. 34 If these programs are carried forward, they will generate
considerable interest in the availability of property rights and other legal interests and quite possibly a good deal of international
controversy *237 as well. Although the Stafford Commission's plans may well be delayed by budget politics and post-Cold
War adjustments, beginning to talk about these issues seriously is important.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
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One strong possibility, in this “New World Order” decade of international cooperation, is that many space efforts, possibly
including all or part of the Space Exploration Initiative, will be international efforts. These efforts invariably involve complex
negotiations and detailed written agreements covering such issues as jurisdiction, intellectual property rights, and liability. One
recent example is the set of agreements governing the multinational space station Freedom. 35 As the participants in these
agreements resolve thorny issues, they will refine the agreements in many respects. This process eventually may produce a
customary law of international cooperation in space, a prospect that I find both interesting and welcome.

V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES
The steadily growing number of nations with some degree of space capability means that space activity is no longer a monopoly
of the two superpowers (if the term “superpower” is even in vogue anymore). As a result, competition in the provision of space
goods and services, for a profit or at least for a fee, also is growing. 36 The different space submarkets--launch services, satellite
hardware, space communications, remote sensing, radiolocation services, and others--are all at different stages of maturity, but
all are potential moneymakers and carry a considerable share of prestige and technology-forcing potential as well.
This may or may not be good. While vigorous competition in providing *238 space goods and services may drive prices down,
benefiting users, such competition may not drive costs down. This may mean that the space markets will become a battleground
of subsidies without space capabilities improving as they should. By “price” I mean the amount charged customers; by “cost” I
mean the total claim on societal resources involved in providing a good or service. Subsidies lower prices, but they do not affect
costs--they merely shift costs from customers to some other party, usually the taxpayer. A market characterized by extensive
government subsidies rarely creates great gains in efficiency because efficiency gains cost money to achieve--for example,
through research and development--but confer no real competitive advantage because competitors may simply increase the
amount of government subsidy they receive. Thus, even a low-priced space market, if characterized by government subsidies,
could have bad effects by discouraging technological developments that would lower costs and increase capabilities over the
long term.
There is some reason to fear that the natural trend in the space field is toward such a market. Many nations are entering the
field because of its importance for prestige, because it is a technology driver, and because it has considerable cross-fertilization
potential with various military technologies, most notably those involved in the production of ballistic missiles. Having entered
the field for non-market reasons, these nations may well prove reluctant to depart it for market reasons. Considerable trade
friction already has occurred in the field. In the launch services arena, one section 301 action actually has been filed, and another
came to the very brink of filing. 37 In addition, Japanese satellite purchases were named under a Super 301 trade proceeding
initiated by the United States Trade Representative. This was resolved after extensive negotiations. 38 Other actions loom on
the horizon.
Trade wars will harm the space industries and prevent free market forces from playing their normal role of increasing efficiency
and improving capabilities. The obvious solution is a well-tailored and enforceable trade agreement covering space goods and
services. Some desultory *239 work on this already has been done, with a number of semi-formal discussions among the United
States and the European Space Agency and the European Community on establishing ground rules for space trade. Aggravating
the problems are the close ties that space industries everywhere have to military research, development, and procurement
administrations. These ties make subsidies hard to spot, or even to define. This is true even in the United States, which has gone
further down the road toward a truly commercial space industry than any other nation. It is far truer elsewhere. 39
Paradoxically, the other space-related trade problem stems from the concern that space trade having to do with ballistic missile
technologies might be too free. Although the danger of ballistic missile proliferation did not receive much attention prior to the
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Persian Gulf war, 40 an agreement among the major space powers has existed for some time that has been aimed at preventing
the spread of critical technologies involved in the production and use of ballistic missiles. 41 This agreement is not clearly
adequate to the task, nor is any agreement clearly adequate to the task. The technologies involved are simply too easy to
learn and too easily implemented with readily available equipment to restrict completely. Nonetheless, it is worth pursuing in
considerable detail. Ultimately, vigorous and forceful diplomacy, not export-control law, will probably do the most to control
the spread of ballistic missiles.

VI. REMOTE SENSING
The term “remote sensing” refers to a variety of information-gathering activities undertaken from space, such as satellite
photography, infrared, laser, and radar imaging, and the gathering of electronic intelligence. Up to now, all such activity has been
typically governmental in nature, either through the various military spy satellites operated by the superpowers, or through the
far less capable public remote sensing systems, such as LANDSAT, operated by the United States through the *240 EOSAT
corporation, and SPOT, a French system. This governmental monopoly exists for both historical and technological reasons.
Until recently, satellite imaging systems have been prohibitively expensive for private purchasers.
That is changing, and it is beginning to appear that private remote sensing systems are becoming feasible. Within the next ten
to twenty years, a major news organization, or consortium of news organizations, probably will orbit its own spy satellite to
gather news that cannot be gathered any other way. A good deal of discussion already has occurred concerning this “mediasat”
and the legal and political issues that it would raise. Most discussion has centered around governmental efforts to control the
information produced by such a satellite for national security reasons.
If the United States asserted this control, serious First Amendment questions would arise, although the regulations currently
governing private remote sensing systems do not really reflect this problem. 42 Furthermore, these systems would face an
uncertain international legal regime. No existing international law prohibits the private remote sensing of other nations. Many
nations, however, abhor the thought that other nations' satellites--perhaps under the control of large oil or mineral companies-might be learning more about their natural resources than they themselves know. 43 In addition, satellite photographs and data
have obvious military importance. These photographs are far more likely to become available to hostile nations and groups if
private systems produce them--particularly those owned by the news media--than if superpower intelligence agencies control
them.
On the other hand, precisely because military officials would not control them, private remote sensing systems might play
an important role in keeping the peace. News media organizations and private arms-control groups with access to satellite
data could play an important armscontrol monitoring role. Moreover, the general availability of this information would tend
to discourage surprise attacks.
Currently, little law on the subject exists, and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty's provision that outer space “shall be free for
exploration and use” is likely to pose a barrier to efforts to limit space-based remote *241 sensing in the name of national
sovereignty. The issue, however, has not been ignored. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) has issued principles on remote sensing that, although they lack legal force, provide some guidance with respect to
the expectations of the international community. 44 Among other things, these principles provide that sensed states shall have
access, on reasonable terms, to the unenhanced data gathered by satellite imaging.
The principles are unlikely to be the last word on the subject, which may well turn out to be a contentious one. Nevertheless, the
great benefits promised by private remote sensing systems are likely to ensure that, one way or another, they wind up flourishing.
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VII. ARMS CONTROL
With the Cold War apparently over, the old disputes 45 about interpretation of the ABM treaty 46 seem passé. Space-related
arms control issues, however, are not dead. Certain military uses of space, for example, as a staging point for nuclear weapons,
are off-limits under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 47 This prohibition is so highly regarded that it likely would be considered
binding even as against nonsignatories. Within a few decades, space-based lasers likely will be capable of menacing aircraft
and even targets on the surface of the earth. Whether these weapons would count as “weapons of mass destruction” under
the Treaty is unclear (although likely), 48 but certainly they are likely to be policed in some fashion. After all, if the prospect
of being photographed from a satellite creates uneasiness, the prospect of being incinerated from one is likely to generate far
stronger feelings. Finally, long-range plans for mining asteroids or the moon often involve moving around large bodies *242
of material in Earth orbit. Such activity also could be done for warlike purposes, with multiton bodies of rock or metal being
directed at targets on Earth with devastating effect. States will undoubtedly insist on strict controls on such activity for safety's
sake. Those enthusiastic about the prospects for asteroid mining often forget this.

VIII. MORE REMOTE ISSUES
I close my discussion with a brief treatment of two issues that are less likely to come up in the next few decades, but that will be
important whenever they do arise. The first is the legal treatment of independent (to a greater or lesser degree) space societies.
The second is contact with extraterrestrial intelligences. Both issues have interested many fine minds, 49 and both will certainly
gain the attention of everyone else should they become a reality.

A. Governance of Space Societies
The problems of governing human societies in outer space no doubt seem rather remote to most, perhaps making it surprising
that the Smithsonian Institution has published an entire book on the subject, 50 and that many writers-- some quite eminent-have written about it or participated in symposia on the topic. 51 Yet the governance of space societies *243 has managed to
capture a great deal of interest, notwithstanding that these societies are still years in the future.
Rudimentary space societies do exist now--in the form of Space Shuttle or space station crews--and there are even the beginnings
of legal principles to govern their operation. 52 The chief interest of scholars and commentators, however, is not these microsocieties, but rather the principles that will govern full-fledged permanent settlements, such as those envisioned by Princeton
physicist Gerard K. O'Neill. 53 I will not attempt to summarize the interesting literature that has developed on this issue, but
rather will make a few general points here.
First, I am a bit concerned by the way in which many writers assume that space societies will necessarily be less free--that is,
less amenable to individual rights to lead different or unconventional lives free from societal restraint. The far-more-fragile life
support systems of space societies of course will require some degree of social control when activities that might endanger others
are concerned. For example, sabotage will no doubt be sharply sanctioned, and many activities that are frequently tolerated on
Earth (such as smoking) are likely to be strictly forbidden. This control, however, need not extend to enforced conformity in
other areas when these concerns do not apply.
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This, however, contradicts much of the literature. For example, William Wu argues that, “[s]pace colonists may face life on a
political leash,” and compares space colony life to that in an oppressive company town.
*244 In a company town, freedom of expression may be in danger. Democracy permits citizens to make public statements
about political figures that they would never say openly about their immediate bosses or top level officers of the companies
for which they work. The security and efficiency of a well-organized and well-run company town in space might be politically
stifling. . . . The colonization of space may point toward a weakening of individual rights and a strengthening of government
power. 54

Many other writers seem to share this view. Life in outer space, they suggest, will be confined, regimented, and conformist; it
would be more like duty on a nuclear submarine than exploration of the final frontier. Space colonists, because of their delicate
life-support systems and precarious social structures, will simply find freedom unaffordable. 55 This view is probably wrong,
but nonetheless it concerns me a great deal.
It is probably wrong because all of the available evidence is that things don't work this way. The closest current analogs to a
space colony are Antarctic bases. But these are not harsh, dictatorial environments. By contrast, the kinds of conditions that
Antarctic crews face tend to force the abandonment of traditional hierarchical systems in favor of more flexible ones:
A winter base in Antarctica is a unique world, where the cook often has greater prestige than the officer-in-charge and the
radio operator can have more influence than an established scientist. The traditional hierarchical structure of the military, and
of government as a whole, breaks down. . . . This was a controversial and embarrassing realization for the Navy. Flexible
authority and sharing of tasks among everyone are vital. . . . This can run against the grain of highly specialized scientists and
career military officers. The absence of women was also a factor. Navy traditions excluded females from the continent, and
this increased tensions.

Some lessons have been learned. With great reluctance, the Navy eventually allowed women on the continent. . . . A more
flexible organizational structure is tolerated, and private enterprise is now providing some services and personnel. . . .
The Antarctican experience reminds us that the dangers of mutiny or psychosis in a space station or colony are as real as the
threat of meteors *245 or solar flares. 56

Experience, thus, tends to suggest that overly rigid and controlled environments are harmful to survival under such conditions,
not essential to it. George Robinson and Harold White agree, stressing that “the real answer to [[[space] community success
probably lies in motivated, self-actualized, strong, adventurous, unconventional, yet disciplined and well-trained human
beings.” 57
I said that the negative view of liberties in space societies worries me even though it is probably wrong. Here is why. Although
I find the topic interesting, I cannot believe that the rather large amount of writing on space societies is driven solely by
interest in the topic itself. Space societies are interesting, but few of us are likely to see them in our lifetimes. I believe that,
consciously or unconsciously, interest in space societies is as high as it is because their future in many ways mirrors our
own. Many characteristics of space societies, such as strong dependence on advanced technology, problems with maintaining
environmental quality, the need for people to work together under stress, and individuals' strong dependence upon their society
for basic necessities such as food and water, are simply amplified images of characteristics already present, and growing, in
our own society.
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This is a good reason for being interested in space societies, since by studying their problems we gain a window into our future
on Earth. It is also a reason to be worried. For if there is a general belief that a high level of interdependence and environmental
fragility means that space settlers will not be able to afford individual rights, then what of those of us who remain on Earth
under similar conditions? I do not believe that the march of technology has made individual rights obsolete, but I worry that
others might reach that conclusion. And I believe that it is a wrong conclusion. Just as space societies will need access to the
creativity and individual initiative of their inhabitants to flourish, so will societies on Earth. Surely the failure of totalitarian
societies worldwide to achieve any kind of social--or even material--greatness should underscore that need.

*246 B. Contact with Extraterrestrial Intelligences
After the rather remote topic of space societies comes another topic seemingly even more remote: contact with extraterrestrial
intelligences. Like the previous topic, this question is interesting not only for its own sake, but for what it tells us about ourselves.
The message here, however, is a bit more heartening.
The first question regarding extraterrestrial intelligences is the hardest one: Do they exist at all? This is a tough question, and
any answer is largely meaningless as a result of the near-total absence of any data. We know little about our own solar system,
and the rest of the universe is awfully large. Yet this inspires a certain kind of probabilistic reasoning. Our own galaxy contains
tens of billions of stars. Starting with this large number, it seems that if only a tiny fraction of those stars have planets, and if
only a tiny fraction of planets have life, and if only a tiny fraction of life is intelligent, then thousands of intelligent species
around our galaxy still should exist, some of which should be relatively close to us. This reasoning led physicist Enrico Fermi's
plaintive cry, “Then where is everybody?” 58
At any rate, our question is not whether intelligent life exists elsewhere, but what to do if we contact it. Contact could occur in
several ways. First, we might go to it, but our technological capabilities are unlikely to be up to this task for many decades, if
not centuries. 59 Second, it may come to us. This requires a very high level of technology on the part of the aliens--at least in the
realm of space transportation. The *247 legal problems that this sort of encounter might create would range from the dramatic
to the picayune, but most would be drowned in the political backwash. Should this kind of contact occur, the prospects for
humanity may not be bright. Certainly the history of our own species suggests that when technologically less-advanced cultures
are brought into contact with technologically more-advanced cultures, the less-advanced cultures tend to suffer, both materially,
through enslavement, exploitation, and so on, and spiritually, through a pervasive sense of inferiority and self-alienation. 60 The
legal challenges stemming from this contact would involve attempting to manage the contact to avoid the deleterious effects
while minimizing restraints on individual and academic freedom. 61
Although the likelihood of this sort of event, quite literally, is incalculable, 62 the potential consequences are significant enough
that a bit of preventive lawyering may be in order. The world community, in drawing back from the nuclear brink (something
that itself seemed wildly unlikely just a few years ago), has already taken one major step toward rendering itself better able to
deal with alien contact. A logical next step would be for lawyers, scientists, and other interested parties to begin thinking about
how this contact would be managed if it should occur. 63
This sort of group activity actually is beginning to happen. A recent publication, First Contact: The Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence, 64 has brought together a number of these parties (including one *248 lawyer) 65 to address just this problem.
Furthermore, a number of scientists involved in searching for extraterrestrial intelligence have drafted a declaration of principles
governing detection. 66 The text of that declaration follows:
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DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING
THE DETECTION OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE
We, the institutions and individuals participating in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence,
Recognizing that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence is an integral part of space exploration and is being undertaken for
peaceful purposes and for the common interest of mankind,
Inspired by the profound significance for mankind of detecting evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence, even though the
probability of detection may be low,
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which commits states as parties to that treaty “to inform the Secretary General of the United
Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the
nature, conduct, locations and results” of their space exploration activities (Article XI),
Recognizing that any initial detection may be incomplete or ambiguous and thus require careful examination as well as
confirmation, and that it is essential to maintain the highest standards of scientific responsibility and credibility,
Agree to observe the following principles for disseminating information about the detection of extraterrestrial intelligence:
1. Any individual, public or private research institution, or governmental agency that believes it has detected a signal from
or other evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence (the discoverer) should seek to verify that the most plausible explanation
for the evidence is the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence rather than some other natural phenomenon or anthropogenic
phenomenon before making any public announcement. If the evidence cannot be confirmed as indicating the existence of
extraterrestrial intelligence, the discoverer may disseminate the information as appropriate to the discovery of any unknown
phenomenon.
2. Prior to making a public announcement that evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence has been detected, the discoverer should
promptly inform *249 all other observers or research organizations that are parties to this declaration, so that those other parties
may seek to confirm the discovery by independent observations at other sites and so that a network can be established to enable
continuous monitoring of the signal or phenomenon. Parties to this declaration should not make any public announcement of
this information until it is determined whether this information is or is not credible evidence of the existence of extraterrestrial
intelligence. The discoverer should inform his/her or its relevant national authorities.
3. After concluding that the discovery appears to be credible evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence, and after informing
other parties to this declaration, the discoverer should inform observers throughout the world through the Central Bureau for
Astronomical Telegrams of the International Astronomical Union, and should inform the Secretary General of the United
Nations in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Because of their demonstrated interest in and expertise
concerning the question of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence, the discoverer should simultaneously inform the
following international institutions of the discovery and should provide them with all pertinent data and recorded information
concerning the evidence: the International Telecommunication Union, the Committee on Space Research of the International
Council of Scientific Unions, the International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, the
International Institute of Space Law and Commission 51 of the International Astronomical Union.
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4. A confirmed detection of extraterrestrial intelligence should be made available to the international scientific community
through publications, meetings, conferences and other appropriate means.
5. All data necessary for confirmation of detection should be made available to the international scientific community through
publications, meetings, conferences and other appropriate means.
6. The discovery should be confirmed and monitored and any data bearing on the evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence should
be recorded and stored permanently to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, in a form that will make it available for
further analysis and interpretation. These recordings should be made available to the international institutions listed above and
to members of the scientific community for further objective analysis and interpretation.
7. If the evidence of detection is in the form of electromagnetic signals, the parties to this declaration should seek international
agreement to protect the appropriate frequencies by exercising the extraordinary procedures established within the World
Administrative Radio Council of the International Telecommunication Union.
8. No response to a signal or other evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence should be sent until appropriate international
consultations have taken place. The procedures for such consultations will be the subject of a *250 separate agreement,
declaration or arrangement.
9. The SETI Committee of the International Academy of Astronautics, in coordination with Commission 51 of the International
Astronomical Union, will conduct a continuing review of procedures for the detection of extraterrestrial intelligence and
the subsequent handling of the data. Should credible evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence be discovered, an international
committee of scientists and other experts should be established to serve as a focal point for continuing analysis of all
observational evidence collected in the aftermath of the discovery, and also to provide advice on the release of information to
the public. This committee should be constituted from representatives of each of the international institutions listed above and
such other members as the committee may deem necessary. To facilitate the convocation of such a committee at some unknown
time in the future, the SETI Committee of the International Academy of Astronautics should initiate and maintain a current
list of willing representatives from each of the international institutions listed above, as well as other individuals with relevant
skills, and should make that list continuously available through the Secretariat of the International Academy of Astronautics.
The International Academy of Astronautics will act as the Depositary for this declaration and will annually provide a current
list of parties to all the parties to this declaration.

The first point to be made about the Declaration is that it is not a formal set of binding legal principles: it is an agreement among
scientists, not among states. Of course, it does not necessarily lose importance, or likelihood of being followed, for that reason.
Indeed, agreements among scientific researchers have a strong history of being followed and this one is likely to be looked to
should the event occur. Moreover, the agreement, although it appears to contemplate the receipt of extraterrestrial radio signals
as the most likely mode of contact, is not limited to those occasions. Paragraph 1 refers to detection of “a signal from or other
evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence”, language that clearly reaches any situation in which extraterrestrial intelligence is
discovered, including radio signals, discovery of artifacts, and outright visits. 67
Once discovery has been made and confirmed, the next question is: what do we do? That is, if we receive alien communications,
do we answer? *251 Humans have already attempted communication with alien species on a few occasions. We have placed
gold plaques and recorded messages on board space probes whose trajectories will ultimately take them into interstellar space,
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and we have beamed messages from radio telescopes to distant stars. This last effort, which Frank Drake originated in 1974,
drew considerable criticism regarding the right of a small group of scientists to speak quite literally for all humanity. 68
One might argue that these criticisms are unfounded. Interstellar distances are so vast that voyages between stars must be
prohibitively expensive, and besides, any alien species that might receive our messages would be so technologically advanced
as to be benign and harmless. The trouble with these arguments is that we have no particular evidence to support them. As
to technology, the fact that we are unable to cross interstellar distances is hardly a guarantee that others may not be able to
do it--we are, after all, only a few decades past being unable to cross the distance between the Earth and its moon. Anyone
who has been at the game of space travel at all has probably been at it longer than us. And even we have the capacity, with
technology readily extrapolatable from the present, to send small packages across interstellar distances. If we were paranoid
enough, those packages could contain destructive nanodevices, or viruses, or other weapons that might be lethal even in small
quantities. I do not believe that humanity is, or is likely to be, that paranoid, but it might be unwise to assume that other species
share our disposition.
As for the argument that other, more advanced species necessarily would be more benign, that too is based on certain
assumptions--most significantly, that intelligence is a civilizing factor. Scholars have noted that human history provides little
support for this claim. As Easterbrook notes:
James Trefil, of George Mason University, has cautioned that if evolution functions approximately the same way on other
worlds that it has functioned here--conferring survival upon the fittest--advanced extraterrestrials might still be aggressive,
territorial, and quick to reach for the sword. In that case, counting on poor alien marksmanship might not be prudent. Even if a
message arrived from a great distance, we might for defensive reasons be compelled to assume that the senders knew something
*252 about the speed-of-light barrier that we didn't, and withhold our reply.
The most disquieting aspect of natural selection as observed on Earth is that it channels intellect to predators. Most bright
animals are carnivores: stalking requires tactics, pattern recognition, and, for social animals, coordinated action, all incubators
of brainpower. . . . This isn't much of a testimonial to “intelligence” [as a guarantee of nonviolence]. 69
Perhaps an alien civilization would have outgrown its violent tendencies, even if innate, by the time it reached a level of
technology that would allow it to contact us. Again, we cannot know. Logically, a species that has attained technological maturity
without destroying itself ought to have tamed its innate tendencies toward violence--perhaps, however, it has merely learned
to channel them exclusively outward, which would be cold comfort to humanity. Furthermore, based on our own experience,
technological progress does not necessarily produce tendencies toward nonviolence. As Easterbrook notes:

Regrettably, the one example we have--human history--does not bear out an assertion that technical progress
and social wisdom are natural partners. Our technology has grown in almost magical fashion over the past
2,000 years, but foreign policy is still practiced pretty much as it was during the Roman Empire. 70

While we should not allow our fears that an alien civilization might be hostile and paranoid to render us hostile and paranoid
ourselves, these concerns certainly suggest that our approach should be cautious. The Outer Space Treaty's requirement that our
activities in outer space should be “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries” 71 reinforces this suggestion. Various
scholars have discussed this problem from different perspectives. Andrew Haley formulated a rule of “metalaw” for dealing
with other species that revises the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as they would have done unto them.” As Haley says, “To treat
others as we would desire to be treated might well mean their destruction.” 72 Obviously, the limits to this principle begin to
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appear when the others' interests begin to collide with our own: science fiction fans might call this the “Klingon Corollary.”
And, of course, there is no guarantee that other civilizations would adopt the same rule.
As always, McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic are more concerned with matters of power and relationship than Haley. They
outline a number of *253 possible scenarios in which aliens quarantine the Earth (as too violent), or in which groups on Earth
conspire with aliens (or even with dissident groups within alien societies) in various power-bloc games, or in which even an
inferior Earth makes use of balance-of-power diplomacy, setting rival alien groups against one another to maintain its own
independence. 73
Ernst Fasan takes an approach that combines some aspects of the two. Stressing that our ability to interact with alien species
will be greater or lesser depending on how much we have in common with them, he recommends that we base our treatment of
those species on Kantian principles. He proceeds to derive a number of universal rules for dealing with alien species based on
natural law and the categorical imperative. 74 Other philosophers have addressed this issue in various other terms. 75
The scientists in the field have considered this approach as well. One group has developed a set of proposed rules, entitled
Proposed Protocol for the Sending of Communication to Extraterrestrial Intelligence, to govern contact with extraterrestrials
once they have been discovered. 76 Those rules follow:

PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR THE SENDING OF
COMMUNICATIONS TO EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE
The Signatories agree that communications with extraterrestrial intelligence will be guided by the following principles:
1. Communications with extraterrestrial intelligence will be undertaken on behalf of all mankind, rather than specific nations,
groups, or individuals.
2. Nations, organizations, and individuals will not unilaterally send communications to extraterrestrial intelligence until
appropriate international consultations have taken place.
3. The Signatories will not cooperate with attempts to communicate with extraterrestrial intelligence which do not conform to
the principles in this protocol.
4. An international group including representation from all interested nations will be formed to deal with the question of whether
such a communication should be sent and, if so, what its content should be.
*254 5. If a decision is made to develop a communication to extraterrestrial intelligence on behalf of mankind, the following
principles will be observed:
a. Respect for the value of life and intelligence.
b. Respect for the value of diversity, including respect for different customs, habits, languages, creeds and religions, approaches
to social organization, and styles of life.
c. Respect for the territory and property of others.
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d. Recognition of the will to live.
e. Recognition of the need for living space.
f. Fair play, justice, mercy.
g. Reciprocity and quid pro quo.
h. Nonviolation of others.
i. Truthfulness and non-deception.
j. Peaceful and friendly welcome.
k. Cooperation.
l. Respect for knowledge, curiosity, and learning.
6. The drafters of a communication to extraterrestrial intelligence will consider detailed information about mankind to be
a commodity of high value which will not be transmitted without due attention to human security and well-being, and to
reciprocity.
7. In the event that extraterrestrials appear to pose a threat to human health, well-being, or peace, no nation shall act without
consulting the Security Council of the United Nations.

Although less ambitious than some of the scholarly writings mentioned earlier, the proposed rules make some important points.
First, contact with alien intelligences would represent an event so important that a decent respect for the well-being of humanity
would forbid any individual or single nation from going ahead without proper consultation. Second, dealings with extraterrestrial
beings would set such an important precedent that they should be conducted in a manner that is straightforward, honest, and
considerate. Third, the stakes would be so high that we should be cautious about revealing too much until we are very sure about
the consequences. Finally, nations should make responses to any threats a global matter, not an individual one. In the unlikely,
but horrific, circumstances of an encounter with hostile aliens, we would want all humanity united from the beginning.
One fascinating aspect of the draft proposal--and, indeed, all thinking about contact with extraterrestrials--is the way in which
our vision of this contact, taking place as it does against a blank slate, is in large part a product of our own hopes, fears, and
predispositions. Between the lines in both of the scientists' documents noted above is a sense that they would most likely be
communicating with their opposite numbers--aliens, perhaps, but alien scientists. On the other hand, a healthy *255 dose of
caution remains, perhaps because scientists themselves know, from long and sometimes bitter experience, that while doing their
jobs, they are often doing the bidding of others less scrupulous. Our vision of intelligent aliens has wavered back and forth over
the years. Sometimes, our vision has reflected Cold War paranoia; aliens are viewed as malevolent invaders, either wielding
weapons of fearsome destructiveness or weaving deceptions of astonishing subtlety, 77 or both. Other times, especially more
recently, they are pictured as noble teachers, far better than we poor humans, come to save us from ourselves, and bring us
enlightenment. In reality, of course, neither is likely to be true. The one prediction I feel fairly confident in making is that if we
encounter intelligent extraterrestrials, we will be surprised regardless of how much we have thought about the subject.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this rather brief and sketchy treatment, I have outlined a number of different issues. Some are of immediate importance:
with orbital debris already altering the character of the Van Allen radiation belts thousands of miles into space and threatening
spacecraft now in orbit with lethal collisions, we cannot afford to wait. With the Moon Treaty coming up for review in the United
Nations General Assembly in 1994, this is the time to begin thinking very seriously about the place of resource-extraction rights
since it is the failure of the Moon Treaty to recognize those rights that has doomed it to marginality since its entry into force.
Other issues I have discussed are likely to materialize only well into the next century, if then.
In spite of these differences, all of these issues--and, indeed, all of the issues of space law generally--have one common feature.
To take space law seriously, one must believe in a future in which humanity flourishes, and one in which law can make a
difference for good. To me, that is part of the appeal. I hope that it is for others as well.
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